Designing secure revocable storage systems for a large number of users in a cloud-based environment is important. Cloud storage systems should allow its users to dynamically join and leave the storage service. Further, the rights of the users to access the data should be changed accordingly. Recently, Liang et al. proposed a cloud-based revocable identity-based proxy re-encryption (CR-IB-PRE) scheme that supports user revocation and delegation of decryption rights. Moreover, to reduce the size of the key update token, they employed a public key broadcast encryption system as a building block. In this paper, we show that the CR-IB-PRE scheme with the reduced key update token size is not secure against collusion attacks. key words: revocable identity-based encryption, key revocation, cloudbased identity-based proxy re-encryption, ciphertext update
Introduction
Nowadays, a cloud storage service is an important infrastructure service that enables clients to store and share data with other users. To prevent information leakage due to the storage of sensitive data in a cloud storage service, a variety of cryptographic primitives have been studied with regard to cloud-based environments. A cloud-based environment should allow its users to dynamically join and leave the service. Therefore, cryptographic schemes for cloud storage systems should be constructed considering the user revocation problem. In 2012, Sahai, Seyalioglu, and Waters [7] introduced the notion of revocable-storage attribute based encryption (RS-ABE). This attribute-based encryption (ABE) is the first to support user revocation and ciphertext update such that the original ciphertext from an earlier time period T can be updated to a new ciphertext at a new time period T + 1 without leaking any plaintext information. However, the RS-ABE system allows anyone to update the ciphertext. This raises the problem that justifiable access of the nonrevoked user to the data in the cloud storage could be interrupted by indiscriminate ciphertext updating by a malicious user, irrespective of the designated update time. This implies that the system needs to enable a designated party who is given the right to update the ciphertext by the key generation center. Recently, Liang et al. [4] proposed a cloudbased revocable identity-based proxy re-encryption (CR-IB- PRE) scheme. This scheme allows only a valid administrator to update the ciphertext with a re-encryption key for the new time period. In contrast to the previous revocable identity-based encryption (RIBE) scheme, this scheme employs public key broadcast encryption as a building block instead of tree-based revocation encryption as a combined structure to reduce the complexity of the key update phase. Unfortunately, this approach makes it insecure against a collusion attack in a security model, as an adversary can obtain key materials to generate the decryption key of the target ciphertext. Identity-based encryption (IBE) and ABE schemes for cloud storage have both been considered as ways to ensure data confidentiality. The IBE scheme is a new public key encryption paradigm where the public key can be the identity string of the user, for instance, an e-mail address. In IBE systems, providing an efficient revocation mechanism for a large number of users is very important because a user's private key can be revealed or a user's credentials may expire. Boneh and Franklin [2] introduced a revocation method that represents an identity as ID||T , where ID is the original identity and T is the current time. Unfortunately, this method is not practical because the center needs to connect with all users by individual secure channels. After Boldyreva et al. [1] proposed the first scalable RIBE scheme, many RIBE schemes were proposed to improve the security and efficiency of the RIBE scheme; these schemes combined a variety of IBE schemes and the tree-based revocation encryption of Naor, Naor, and Lotspiech [5] , where the center's workload increases logarithmically with an increase in the number of users [8] . Park et al. [6] presented a RIBE scheme with constant-sized private and update keys by using multilinear maps. Even though many RIBE and RABE schemes have been presented by various researchers, the existing RIBE and RABE schemes that support only key revocation are limited with respect to their application to cloud storage systems. In RIBE, a user that is revoked at time T can decrypt the ciphertexts that were encrypted before T because the decryption key of the revoked user is still available to decrypt these ciphertexts. To solve this problem, Sahai, Seyalioglu, and Waters [7] proposed an RS-ABE system for cloud-based environments. Lee et al. [3] then proposed an improved RS-ABE system and a revocable storage predicate encryption system. In this paper, we analyze the security of Liang et al.'s CR-IB-PRE scheme with the reduced key update token size.
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Review of Liang et al.'s CR-IB-PRE Scheme
Bilinear Maps
Definition 2.1 (Bilinear Maps): Let G and G T be two (multiplicative) cyclic groups of prime order p. We assume that g is a generator of G. Let e : G × G → G T be a function that has the following properties:
• Bilinearity: The map e satisfies the following relation:
Thus, we say that G is a bilinear group and the map e is a bilinear pairing in G. Note that e(,) is symmetric since
2.2 Basic CR-IB-PRE Scheme of Liang et al.
Setup(1 λ , N):
This algorithm takes as input a security parameter 1 λ and the maximum number of the users N. It generates bilinear groups G = (G, G T ) of prime order p. Let g be the generator of G and (p, G, e) be the description of bilinear groups. It selects random elements 
TokenUp(T i , RL, MK, S T, PP):
This algorithm takes as input time T , revocation list RL, master key MK, state S T , and public parameters PP. It selects a random exponent r T ∈ Z p and outputs token τ T by implicitly in-
This algorithm takes as input private key S K ID , token τ T , and public parameters PP. It selects random exponents r 1 , r 2 ∈ Z p and outputs decryption key DK ID|T by implicitly including T as (ID, T , θ) ). where θ ∈ R G T ,r 2 is recovered from (ID|T ,r 1 ,r 2 ), which is stored in List S K ID|T . 2. ReKey(S K ID|T , ν T →T ): It selects a random exponent r ∈ Z p and outputs re-encryption key 
ReEnc(RK T →T i , CT ID,T i ): This algorithm takes as input
re-encryption key RK T →T as (rk 1 , rk 2 , rk3), and ci-
TCR 1 (θ) ) and sets the re-encrypted ciphertext CT ID,T to (C 0 , C 1 , C 4 , rk 3 ). Note that if CT ID,T needs to be further re-encrypted for time T , then the proxy parses rk 3 as (Ĉ 0 ,Ĉ 1 ,Ĉ 2 ,Ĉ 3 ). It takes as input the re-encryption key RK T →T as (rk 1 , rk 2 , rk 3 ), and the proxy then computes C 4 = e(Ĉ 1 , rk 1 )/e(Ĉ 2 , rk 2 ) and
Decrypt(CT ID,T , DK ID,T , PP): This algorithm takes as in
, and public parameters PP.
For the original ciphertext, it computes e(C
, and outputs message C 0 /e(g 1 , g 2 ) t = M. 2. For a re-encrypted ciphertext, it does the following:
• If the re-encrypted ciphertext is re-encrypted only once, i.e., CT ID,
• If the ciphertext is re-encrypted l times from time T 1 to T l+1 , i.e., CT ID,
, and finally outputs message C (1) 0 · e(C 
N+2+z for user ID, where z represents the index for identity ID.
TokenUp(T, RL, MK, S T, PP):
This algorithm first defines a non-revoked set S of user identities at time T from RL. After constructing token
Before constructing the decryption key as in the DeKeyGen algorithm of the basic scheme, this DeKeyGen algorithm derives the token as
The rest of the algorithms are the same as those of the basic scheme.
Our Security Analysis
Security Model of the CR-IB-PRE Scheme
The security model of CR-IB-PRE was introduced by Liang et al. [4] . In this security model, the update token query takes as input identity ID and time T . If ID ID * , the update token oracle outputs a valid update token. Otherwise, the update token oracle outputs ⊥. However, this is not realistic in practice because the update tokens are generated regardless of identity ID in the real world. (The update tokens are generated by implicitly including time T and revocation list RL.) This condition restricts the adversary from obtaining more information about the private key and update token. In this paper, we propose a CR-IB-PRE security model that is a refined version of Liang et al.'s security model. The security of CR-IB-PRE is formally defined as follows: Definition 3.1 (Security): The security of a CR-IB-PRE scheme under chosen plaintext attacks is defined in terms of the following experiment between a challenger C and probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) adversary A: • If a private key query for an identity ID such that ID = ID * was requested, then identity ID * should be revoked at some time T such that T ≤ T * .
• The decryption key query for ID * and T * was not requested.
C flips a random coin b ∈ {0, 1} and gives the challenge ciphertext CT * to A by running Encrypt(ID * , T * , M * b , PP).
Phase 2:
A may continue to request a polynomial number of private keys, update tokens, decryption keys, and re-encryption keys subject to the same restrictions as before. , where the probability is taken over the entire randomness of the experiment. A CR-IB-PRE scheme is secure in this security model against the chosen plaintext attacks if, for all PPT adversaries A, the advantage of A for security parameter λ in the above experiment is negligible.
Analysis of Liang et al.'s CR-IB-PRE Scheme
The following lemma shows that there is a PPT algorithm that can distinguish challenge message M b with nonnegligible probability.
Lemma 3.2:
There exists a PPT algorithm A that can distinguish whether challenge ciphertext CT * is encrypted from message M 0 or M 1 if A generates the private key query for the non-revoked identity ID at challenge time T * after the revocation query for identity ID at some time T such that T > T * .
